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## RUSSIA'S WARS IN THE 21st CENTURY AND MIGRATION CHALLENGES FOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

*Migration processes have the potential to impact the economic, social, and political systems in the countries of emigration and immigration. Local norms and cultural differences are the factors leading to significant transformations. Europe has been a historical center of migration and has attracted migrants with various cultural, social, and economic backgrounds. The intensification of migration processes after World War II was due to demographic changes and economic integration processes. It required the development of basic infrastructure responsible for the effective adaptation of migrants to the new conditions for them. However, the wars started by Russia in Ukraine and Syria created unforeseen challenges for European countries, when millions of asylum seekers and migrants became a part of communities. The labour markets and social systems of these countries were not fully prepared for such stress. The research hypothesizes that the increased flows of migrants and refugees to the European Union have a long-term impact on block's economic development, social prospects, and demographic structure. This study combined qualitative and exploratory research methods, specifically a systematic literature review and case study research. The research highlights that, on the one hand, the dynamics of migration to the European Union reflected the trends of expansion in historical perspective. On the other hand, migration*

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## ВІЙНИ РОСІЇ ХХІ ст. І МІГРАЦІЙНІ ВИКЛИКИ ДЛЯ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ КРАЇН

*Міграційні процеси мають потенціал впливу на економічні, соціальні та політичні системи в країнах еміграції та імміграції. Місцеві норми та культурні відмінності є факторами, що призводять до значних трансформацій. Європа була історичним центром міграції та приваблювала мігрантів з різним культурним, соціальним та економічним походженням. Інтенсифікація міграційних процесів після Другої світової війни зумовлена демографічними змінами та процесами економічної інтеграції. Це вимагало розвитку базової інфраструктури, відповідальної за ефективну адаптацію мігрантів до нових для них умов. Однак війни, розпочаті росією в Україні та Сирії, створили непередбачені виклики для європейських країн, зокрема мільйони шукачів притулку та мігрантів стали частиною громад. Ринки праці та соціальні системи цих країн не були повністю готові до такого стресу. Висунуто гіпотезу, що збільшення потоків мігрантів та біженців до Європейського Союзу має довгостроковий вплив на економічний розвиток, соціальні перспективи та демографічну структуру блоку. Це дослідження поєднує якісні та пошукові методи дослідження, зокрема систематичний огляд літератури та дослідження конкретних випадків. У дослідженні підкреслюється, що, з одного боку, динаміка міграції до Європейського Союзу відображала тенденції розширення в історичній перспективі.*



*processes were affected by external factors, among them the forced migration of millions of people from Syria and Ukraine because of russia's military aggression.*

*Keywords:* international migration, European integration, labour mobility, migration policy, labour market.

**JEL Classification:** F22, J61, O52.

*З іншого – на міграційні процеси впливали зовнішні фактори, серед яких вимушена міграція мільйонів людей із Сирії та України через воєнну агресію росії.*

*Ключові слова:* міжнародна міграція, європейська інтеграція, мобільність робочої сили, міграційна політика, ринок праці.

### Introduction

Migration plays an important role in modern international economic relations. Disparities in economic, social, political, and ecological development are motivating (or forcing) different groups of people to move to the so-called centres of migration. Europe in general and the European Union in particular are among them.

Migration can potentially open opportunities and provide safety, but, at the same time, could increase the risks associated with discrimination and social isolation. Dustmann et al. (2016) demonstrate that migrant groups could systematically face fewer labour market opportunities compared to local citizens due to discriminatory practices with the same observed education and experience levels. It could be an element of a government policy or social biases. As a result, socio-economic consequences could vary from country to country. The European Union faced a systemic challenge that required a unified approach to the migration policy.

The Russian Federation has started to weaponize this fact in its hybrid operations after the presidency of Putin. The processes of weaponization have intensified after the involvement of Russia in the civil war in Syria, which caused massive flows of migrants to the neighbouring countries (Türkiye, Jordan, and other countries) and the European Union. Eggen and Lavikainen (2025) argue that totalitarian regimes are using migration in an innovative way as an unconventional method of war. Gridina and Kasyanova (2019) analyse the dimensions of migration weaponization and assuming that it creates the effect of a slow-motion explosion, which can detonate at any moment and be used as a time mechanism in the hands of the aggressor in political, information, educational, mental spaces: loosening of social unity, creating agents of influence of "Russian peace", the introduction of intolerance and socio-regional xenophobia. Dennison and Geddes (2019) demonstrate that there are strong correlations over time between the salience of immigration and the polling of such parties in most Western European countries. So, the Russian policy of migration weaponization could potentially lead to negative medium-term and long-term effects for European economic development and social stability.

Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk (2022) analyzed the experience of Ukrainian and Syrian refugees and migrants in the European Union and stated the differences in adaptation and integration, demographic structure, and policy approaches.

The paper aims to identify key trends and effects of recent migration flows to the European Union, escalated by the Russian aggression against Ukraine and Syria.

The research hypothesizes that the increased flows of migrants and refugees to the European Union have long-term effects on block's economic development, social prospects, and demographic structure.

This study combined qualitative and exploratory research methods, specifically a systematic literature review and case study research.

The paper is organized in the following way: chapter 1 analyses general migration trends in the European Union, and chapter 2 analyses the impact of wars in Ukraine and Syria, caused by Russian aggression, on the European labour market and migration policy.

## 1. Migration trends in the European Union

Today's migration processes in the European Union have no analogue in the whole world. These processes originated from the moment when the European Economic Community emerged. Back in 1951, when the Treaty of Paris stipulated the creation of an interstate association of "Coal and Steel", which included France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, there was a gradual development of economic and political relations that later served as the basis for expansion. So, already in 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed on the free movement of people between these countries, which marked the liberalization of the migration of people within the framework of this association. Subsequently, the effectiveness of political, economic, and migration policies served as a solid basis for considering association with new European countries. Thus, in February 07, 1992, in the Netherlands, the Treaty on European Union was signed, which included such countries as Belgium, Great Britain, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, France, and Germany. The effectiveness of the unification of European countries clearly reflected the trend of the future expansion of the European Union, which also characterized the free movement of people between countries.

*Figure 1* illustrates the dynamics of migration in the countries of the European Union for the period from 1960 to 2021.




Figure 1. Migrant population in EU, 1960–2021

Source: our elaboration based on (European Union, n. d.).

Based on this figure, we can state the fact that from 1960 to the beginning of the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this trend did not change much; it had its own growth within 10–15% per decade. But since the collapse of the USSR and the growth of scientific and technological progress, the trend has clearly begun to pick up its pace since the beginning of the 90s and, on average, increased by more than 15–17% per decade in each subsequent decade. According to Eurostat data, already in 2021, the statistics of migrants in the EU countries were: "Migrant population: 23.7 million non-EU citizens living in the EU on 01.01.2021. The number of people residing in an EU Member State with citizenship of a non-member country on 01 January 2021 was 23.7 million, representing 5.3% of the EU population. In addition, there were 13.7 million persons living in one of the EU Member States on 01 January 2021 with the citizenship of another EU Member State. In absolute terms, the largest numbers of non-nationals living in the EU Member States on 01 January 2021 were found in Germany (10.6 million persons), Spain (5.4 million), France, and Italy (both 5.2 million). Non-nationals in these four Member States collectively represented 70.3% of the total number of non-nationals living in all the EU Member States, while the same four Member States had a 57.6% share of the EU's population (Eurostat, 2022; n. d.). The publication of the European Commission additionally provides the following data as of January 01, 2021: "Overall figures of immigrants in European society: 447.2 million inhabitants living in the EU; 23.7 million were non-EU citizens (5.3% of the EU's total population); 37.5 million people were born outside the EU (without those born in another EU countries) – 8.4% of all EU inhabitants". (European Commission, 2025). The statistics of EU residents who came from other countries are as follows (*Figure 2*).




Figure 2. Foreign-born residents per country in the EU, 2021

Source: our elaboration based on (European Commission, 2025).

The tendency of the last 5 years clearly shows an increase in the number of migrants to the EU countries. First, it can be argued that this growth began its active phase against the background of wars initiated by Russia against Syria and Ukraine. In the arena of world geopolitics, 2014 can rightfully be considered a turning point, taking into account the beginning of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine through the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, and the formation of the so-called republics of the DPR and LPR, which subsequently in 2022 turned into a full-scale military invasion and occupation by Russia of the territories of Ukraine.

## **2. The impact of migration from Ukraine and Syria on the EU**

Let us consider the migration processes of the population to the EU countries, on the example of the most vulnerable territories affected by military aggression – Ukraine and Syria. Russia's military aggression began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, and then in 2015 during the civil war in Syria, when the current political regime was supported: "Russia has supported the administration of incumbent President Bashar al-Assad of Syria since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011: politically, with military aid, and (since September 2015) with direct military involvement. The 2015 deployment to Syria marked the first time since the end of the Cold War in 1991 that Russia entered an armed conflict outside the borders of the former Soviet Union.

The political support of Bashar al-Assad by Russia was connected, first of all, with the consolidation of Russia's political and economic influence in the Middle East. Considering the impossibility of the Syrian armed forces controlled by Bashar al-Assad to hold back the opposition, military support from Russia meant direct interference in the sovereignty of an independent state, at the cost of millions of refugees, as well as civilian casualties. According to Aljazeera, the results of Russia's military intervention in Syria are difficult to characterize as rational, including from an economic point of view, in relation to Russia itself: "Moscow has also failed to leverage its position in the Syrian conflict to jump-start dialogue with the West on sanctions or even get Western Europe to commit to funding the reconstruction of war-ravaged Syria (Al Jazeera, 2020, October 1).

Aljazeera, investigating the question of what was the benefit of military intervention in Syria for Russia, cites the military spending as facts, and also quotes the rationale for these costs from Russia: two years after the start of the intervention, Russia's defense budget dropped from 5.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) (USD 79 billion) in 2016 to 3.7% (USD 61.4 billion) in 2018, alleviating fears of overspending on the military. At the same time, the Russian government has presented the operation in Syria as an opportunity to test and promote Russian weaponry (something other

large arms exporters, like the US and Israel, have also done in the region). In 2017, the defense ministry said some 600 new weapons had been tested in military action in Syria. From this, we can conclude that the russian intervention was nothing more than a claim to "influence" Syria at the cost of military spending and russia's testing of new types of weapons. Thus, the nature of the intervention implied nothing more than the satisfaction of cynical political ambitions with an unknown result, since the conflict remained unresolved, but provoked an incredibly large wave of migrants and refugees to the EU.

Over time, the conflicts began to flare up in other countries as well, on the territories which are controlled by the russian federation with the help of force. "russia's current foreign policy priorities include the political crisis in belarus and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. This has pushed to the background the Syrian war, wherein the russian government is mainly interested in preserving the status quo and maintaining a frozen conflict". From the foregoing, it can be assumed that the russian political and military leadership, having barely achieved their goals in Syria, were forced to stop, due to limited budgetary resources and the emerging new military-political crises in the border areas of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and belarus.

Among the victims of russian military aggression, one should also consider the refugees who found support from the EU countries. According to statistics provided by the European Commission, the TOP 10 European countries that provided support to refugees from Syria in the EU at the end of 2020 (*Figure 3*).




Figure 3. European countries for asylum applications

Source: our elaboration based on (European Commission, 2021).


After analyzing the data, it can be argued that the European Union countries have become one of the largest countries in the world that aided refugees from Syria, who became victims of the russian military invasion.

On July 29, 2021 the EU Delegation announced key areas in favour of resolving the Syrian conflict: "The EU's strategic objectives in Syria are focused on six key areas: An end to the war through a genuine political transition, in line with UNSCR 2254, negotiated by the parties to the conflict under the auspices of the UN Special Envoy for Syria and with the support of key international and regional actors. Promote an inclusive transition in Syria, in line with UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué, through support for the strengthening of the political opposition. Save lives by addressing the humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable Syrians across the country, in a timely, effective, efficient, and principled manner. Promote democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech by strengthening Syrian civil society organizations. Promote accountability for war crimes with a view to facilitating a national reconciliation process and transitional justice. Support the resilience of Syria's population and society (European External Action Service, 2024). On March 15, 2022, the UNHCR Refugee Agency notes the following: "Syria remains the world's largest displacement crisis. More than 13 million people have either fled the country or are displaced within its borders. Neighbouring and nearby countries require continued international support, having generously welcomed more than 5.6 million Syrian refugees – the vast majority worldwide" (UNHCR, 2022, March 15).

At the same time, the Politifact publication cites statistics with reference to the UN on Syrian refugees, which are as follows: "There are more than 4.89 million Syrian refugees according to the UN's latest count". (PolitiFact, 2017) In terms of gender and age, the following information is provided: "Ellison referenced a UNHCR regional demographic breakdown based on refugees registered in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. To determine a figure for women and children, Ellison summed the percentage of registered Syrian males under 18 years old with the percentage of women of all ages – it comes out to about 73 percent. Factoring in women of all ages and boys under 12 years old, it's about 66 percent. Ellison's other point about "a full third" of refugees being younger than 12 years old also checks out for the UNHCR group" (PolitiFact, 2017). All these trends are quite new to Europe, bringing with them potentially dramatic changes in the current demographic structure of Europe. Most of them are young people of an average, fairly young age, which will undoubtedly affect and change the demographic future of Europe.

Along with the smoldering Syrian conflict and millions of people left homeless after a military invasion, Russia is undertaking another military aggression aimed at the so-called "brotherly" neighboring country, Ukraine. It was Russia's war in Ukraine that provoked an incredible flow of refugees and migrants from Ukraine, among which 90% are young women and children. Starting from February 24, 2022, and until January 2023, the number of refugees from Ukraine increased; however, during this period, cases of people returning to Ukraine were also noted many times.

It should also be noted that during the period 2010–2020, almost several hundred thousand Ukrainians who came to the EU were registered for citizenship, which is reflected in the following table: Number of Ukrainians acquiring citizenship of an EU Member State between 2010 and 2020 (*Figure 4*).



Note: EU total = 184 405 (including data for Romania for 2013–2016 and 2020).

(\*) Provisional.

(\*) 2013–2016 and 2020. Estimate.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr\_acq)

eurostat

Figure 4. Number of Ukrainians acquiring citizenship of an EU

Source: (Eurostat, 2022).

Let us consider the migration processes of the population to the EU countries, using the example of Ukraine, which suffered from military aggression. According to the IMF report dated December 15, 2022, the highest level of refugees from Ukraine is noted: Almost 8 million refugees have fled Ukraine since Russia's invasion in February, Europe's largest refugee wave since World War II, with the majority of those now in the European Union. These figures will increase depending on the war's duration and severity (International Monetary Fund, 2022). Also in the IMF report, it is noted that the assistance was provided by the European Union especially quickly and decisively, namely: "Europe reacted with swift and decisive support, and 4.8 million people from Ukraine are registered for temporary protection in the EU or in similar national programs". The EU has removed many barriers that refugees typically face by offering residency rights, work permits, and access to health care, schools, housing, and banking services (International Monetary Fund, 2022, December 15). In the context of European countries that accepted Ukrainian refugees and provided the necessary support, it is shown in *Figure 5*. The IMF report also draws attention to the fact that the EU countries, which are actively increasing the amount of necessary assistance, will significantly increase by the end of the year. Supporting refugees comes with some short-term fiscal costs. Across the EU, these could reach EUR 30 billion to EUR 37 billion in the

first year, or about 0.2% of gross domestic product. The unprecedented assistance from the EU indicates, first of all, the readiness of the EU countries to consider Ukraine not just an associate member of the EU, but also indicates the prospect of EU membership, especially taking into account the employment of Ukrainians in the EU labour market: "We estimate that Ukrainian refugees could raise the size of Europe's labour force by some 0.6 percent by the end of 2022, and by 2.7% in the countries with the largest numbers of arrivals, where Ukrainian refugees will ease labour shortages (*Figure 5*).




Figure 5. Ukrainian refugees, total

Source: our elaboration based on (International Monetary Fund, 2022, December 15).

These statistical facts confirm that, on the part of refugees from Ukraine, many people find an opportunity to get a job and, in this way, among other things, support the EU economy, which provides assistance to Ukraine. Refugee statistics by age and gender, according to data as of May 2022, are presented in *Figure 6*.

From the above statistical sample presented in the *Figure*, a significant part of Ukrainian refugees are women and children. According to the given publication of "Ukrainska Pravda", dated July 13, 2022, a significant part of Ukrainians does not plan to return to Ukraine: "About two-thirds of Ukrainians who went abroad with the start of a full-scale war, so far (July 2022) do not plan to return to Ukraine". This is evidenced by the results of a survey conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The survey was conducted among 4 900 Ukrainians now living in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia, in mid-May to mid-June (Ukrainska Pravda, 2022, July 13). But it should be noted that at the beginning of 2023, many refugees from Ukraine returned to their homes.




Figure 6. Who is fleeing the war (to the EU), 2022

Source: our elaboration based on (Euronews, 2022).

There is a tendency in favour of increasing the number of Ukrainians who returned to their homeland. This is evidenced by the September 16, 2022, publication "Zakordon 24": "More than 8 million Ukrainians have arrived in the EU countries since the beginning of the war. But there is good news on both sides. Many Ukrainians have already returned. About 5 million have already returned to Ukraine. Of course, we want to give Ukrainian friends who need help as much support as possible. But we also know that they want to go back home again, rebuild Ukraine and turn it into a successful state, – said the President of the European Commission" (24tv.ua, 2022). As a result of the war, the first waves of migration from Ukraine to the EU countries reflected the maximum number of people who left for the EU. However, for various reasons, after some time, a significant part of Ukrainians decided to return. From this, it can be assumed that the part of Ukrainians that remains in the European Union is gradually adapting to local conditions, including finding a job and providing a standard of living that they could not afford if they returned to Ukraine.

However, a significant part of Ukrainians remains in the European Union. According to the publication Operational Data Portal on January 03, 2023, the statistics are as follows: "4 905 293 Refugees from Ukraine registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe" (UNHCR, 2022, March 15). Considering that mainly the Polish-Ukrainian border is the main border crossing point, for many Ukrainians, Poland becomes a country not only for seeking asylum, but also as a distribution centre for onward movement to other EU countries. The publication

"Ukrainian in Poland" notes the following: "Poland has become a country where the majority of Ukrainians have found refuge, who crossed the Ukrainian border, fleeing from full-scale Russian aggression. According to the Polish Border Guard Service (Straż Graniczna), from February 24 to January 1, 2023, more than 8.841 million refugees from Ukraine crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border. It should be noted that exactly a month ago, on December 1, 2022, this figure was just over 8.121 million people". (Ukrainian in Poland, 2022).

Indeed, Ukrainian refugees, getting into the EU countries, receive the necessary assistance to ensure their lives during their stay in a particular European country. The Ukrainian edition of "Mind" provides information about the support of Ukrainians from the EU countries, referring to the IMF analytical report. According to this report, Poland (1.35 million) and Germany (970 000) became the most hospitable countries in the Eurozone, hosting the most people. But if we consider as a percentage of the country's population, then the maximum hospitality was shown by the Czech Republic (the number of Ukrainians who received asylum from them is 4% of the country's population), Estonia (3.9%), Poland (3.6%) and Moldova (3.5%). More than 3.9 million Ukrainians have received temporary protection status or similar statuses in the Eurozone. Thus, Poland issued 1.35 million ID cards, the Czech Republic – more than 423 000, Italy – 153 900, Spain – 139 000. 90% of refugees are women with children, from 22% to 44% of refugees are children. It also provides estimates of EU payments to support refugees from Ukraine, namely: "According to preliminary calculations, the cost of the "invasion" of Ukrainian refugees in the EU will be from EUR 30–37 billion per year, or from 0.19% to 0.23% of EU GDP. Although a significant part of the refugees lives in rented apartments, for which they themselves pay or which are paid for by charitable organizations from Ukraine and other countries" (Ukrainian in Poland, 2022).

Ukrainian refugees, staying in the EU countries, also master the local labour market. For example, in Poland, according to the publication "European Website in Integration", the following employment statistics are given: "Since the introduction of a special law easing access to the labour market in Poland, 185 000 refugees from Ukraine have started work in the country. The law makes refugees from Ukraine eligible for employment even if they do not have a work permit or a PESEL number – the unique personal identifier issued to residents. Instead, refugees from Ukraine can start work if their employer informs the local labour office about the hire within 14 days. The procedure applies to Ukrainian nationals and non-EU spouses of Ukrainian nations who arrived in Poland on or after 24 February 2022, or the start of the war" (European Commission, 2025, July 10).

The European Union also provides significant support to Ukrainian refugees in finding work, offering appropriate tools as a pilot project, according to Reuters. "The European Commission unveiled a new online tool

to help Ukrainians find a job as the bloc looks to extend its protection for those displaced by russia's invasion for another year. ... The pilot job-search tool, managed by the European Labour Authority, is available in English, Ukrainian and russian and linked to the EU's cooperation network of employment services with over 3 million vacancies" (Reuters, 2022, October 10). The potential involvement of Ukrainian refugees in the labour market of the EU countries is currently being studied. The OECD publication is investigating this issue and proposes the following conclusions: "Although the projections are made in the context of high levels of uncertainty, for all European countries together, the labour force is expected to increase by about 0.5% by the end of 2022. For individual countries, the largest increase is found in three countries: the Czech Republic (2.2%), Poland (2.1%), and Estonia (1.9%). The estimated effect on employment shows a similar ranking of countries, with the Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia exhibiting a significant increase of at most 1.9%, while the overall impact across all European host countries is estimated to be 0.4%. The overall estimated impact on labour force is about twice as large as that of the 2014–2017 inflow of refugees to the European Union. Most of it will be observed in a few countries (in relative terms, Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia) and, given the differences in migrant profiles between 2014–2017 and today, with more women and more high-educated, the most affected labour market segments will be different – likely less unskilled manual labour and more service occupations" (OECD, 2022). Based on the analysis of the data by the OECD publication, preliminary results have been obtained, which indicate the following: "The impact on the European labour force of the inflow of Ukrainians is measurable: an increase of an estimated 0.5% by the end of 2022, although impact is uneven and several countries seeing increases of as much as 1.9%. The estimated impact is about twice as large as that of the 2015–2017 inflow of refugees" (OECD, 2022).

### Conclusions

Based on the above analytical data, as well as considering the EU policy aimed at facilitating the employment of Ukrainian refugees, we can assume a growing tendency in the number of Ukrainians involved in the European labour market in 2023. An analysis of the above data obtained from various sources suggests that significant migration processes in the European Union were due to at least several factors. On the one hand, migration was at the stages of the expansion of the Eurozone and the liberalization of population migration within the Eurozone; on the other hand, it was due to external factors. External factors include, first of all, the forced migration of affected people from Syria and Ukraine because of russia's military aggression. Despite all the economic difficulties, the European Union, from the beginning of its founding, has continued the economic and political policy of sustainable development and expansion, providing unprecedented

support to all people, and especially to forced refugees from war-affected countries.

Key trends and effects of recent migration flows to the European Union, escalated by the Russian aggression against Ukraine and Syria, were identified. The current impact of the highlighted trends was analysed.

The research hypothesis was confirmed. The increased flows of migrants and refugees to the European Union have long-term effects on the block's economic development, social prospects, and demographic structure.

The prospects of the migration consequences in the European Union are difficult to predict now. A significant proportion of refugees, including women with children, may decide to return to their homeland to rebuild the country and reunite with family and friends. However, there remains a high probability that many will decide to stay in the European Union. The consequences of Russia's military invasion of Syria and Ukraine, the subsequent refugee crisis, may be analysed decades later, after the end of the military conflict and the refugees' return to their homeland. But today, it is clear and understandable that these migration flows, the flows of refugees caused by wars, provoked by Russia, will have great consequences in the EU, and not only migration, but also demographic.

Further research could be concentrated on the process of second-generation adaptation to the European economic conditions. Also, the long-term impact of re-emigrants on the national economies should be at the centre of further research.

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