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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF POST-WAR RE-EMIGRATION

Introduction. After the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation a large number of citizens left Ukraine. Most of them have chosen European countries as their place of residence, whose government have shown interest in the assimilation of Ukrainian refugees, and some of the migrants plan to return home.

Problem. The departure of a significant number of Ukrainian citizens abroad had a negative impact both on the state of the domestic market due to a significant drop in demand, and on the labour market, in particular in the service sector, which suffered significantly during the war. In the future, for some families, the question of reunification may arise not in Ukraine, but abroad.

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СОЦІАЛЬНО-ЕКОНОМІЧНІ ДЕТЕРМІНАНТИ ПОВОЄННОЇ РЕЕМИГРАЦІЇ

Вступ. Після повномасштабного вторгнення РФ Україну залишила велика кількість громадян. Більшість з них обрали місцем проживання європейські країни, уряди яких виявили зацікавленість в асиміляції українських біженців, а частина з мігрантів планує повернутись додому.

Проблема. Виїзд значної кількості українських громадян за кордон негативно позначився як на стані внутрішнього ринку через відсутнє падіння попиту, так і на ринку праці, зокрема й у сфері послуг, яка значно постраждала в умовах війни. У перспективі для частини сімей може постати питання про об'єднання не в Україні, а за кордоном.



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The aim of the study is to determine the factors that will influence the return of Ukrainian refugees after the end of the war.

Methods. The research was conducted using methods of systematic and comparative analysis, sociological method in combination with cultural and behavioural methods.

Results. Despite the strong "sense of home" many parents have, their decision to return home to Ukraine is influenced by the desire to ensure a stable life for their children in countries that guarantee social protection, security and transparency of business, opportunities for social growth.

Conclusions. At the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, mostly representatives of small and medium-sized businesses and/or their relatives or friends left Ukraine. The possible threat to their lives and health during hostilities keeps them from returning. The availability of housing is a determining motivational factor for return for a relatively small number of respondents, the most important factor is the opportunity to work or manage legitimate business structures.

Keywords: migration policy, population migration, population employment, external labour migrations, national security.

JEL Classification: F22.

Метою дослідження є визначення чинників, які впливатимуть на повернення українських біженців після завершення війни.

Методи. Дослідження проведено із застосуванням системного, компаративного, соціологічного аналізу у поєднанні із культурологічним та поведінковим методами.

Результати дослідження. Попри сильне "почуття дому" у багатьох батьків на їхнє рішення повернутися додому в Україну впливає бажання забезпечити своїм дітям стабільне життя в країнах, які гарантують соціальний захист, безпеку та прозорість бізнесу, можливості для соціального зростання.

Висновки. На початку повномасштабного вторгнення РФ Україну залишили переважно представники малого та середнього бізнесу та/або їхні родичи чи друзі. Можлива загроза їхньому життю та здоров'ю під час бойових дій утримує їх від повернення. Наявність житла є визначальним мотиваційним фактором повернення для порівняно невеликої кількості респондентів, найбільш важливим чинником є можливість працювати або керувати законними бізнес-структурами.

Ключові слова: міграційна політика, міграція населення, зайнятість населення, зовнішня трудова міграція, національна безпека.

Introduction. Due to the full-scale invasion of the troops of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, according to the UN, 7 891 977 Ukrainian citizens (as of the end of November 2022), about 90% of whom were women with children [1], were forced to leave Ukraine, and almost 4.8 million of them received temporary protection [2]. The explanatory note to the draft Law of Ukraine "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2023" stated that the negative balance of migration in 2022 could amount to 9.43 million people [3]. The vast majority of Ukrainian citizens who left the country did so during the first weeks after Russia's full-scale attack. However, already in the summer of 2022, a significant part of those who left returned home. And later, even the aggressor's massive missile attacks on infrastructure facilities in Ukraine did not cause new migration waves. The vast majority of citizens decided to spend the winter in their homeland, avoiding moving abroad. Thus, 67 % of respondents did not even plan to go abroad, and another 20 % of respondents emphasized that they did not plan to leave, but could change their opinion if there was no electricity or heating for a long time [4].

By the end of 2022, hopes for a relatively quick end to hostilities proved futile, and it became clear that the war could continue indefinitely. This, in turn, actualized the question of the further fate of Ukrainian forced migrants with the determination of the prospects and nature of re-emigration.

It is extremely important to understand the scale of future re-emigration in conditions where it is necessary to ensure the reconstruction of industrial and infrastructure facilities destroyed by the enemy, to ensure the growth of the domestic market of goods and services for further economic development. An increase in demand for domestically produced goods due to re-emigration would make it possible to stimulate production and improve the work of the service sector. Therefore, determining the measures that could positively affect the growth of re-emigration rates is an important task of ensuring the national security of the state.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Some aspects of the selected research topic are presented in the scientific works of E. Libanova [5; 6]. The researcher has repeatedly emphasized the possibility of reunification of Ukrainian families abroad after the war in case of prolonged hostilities. In her opinion, a significant number of Ukrainian citizens will be forced to look for ways of socialization abroad due to the impossibility of ensuring their own safety in Ukraine. I. Gerlach, O. Ryndzak [7] emphasize the importance of choosing a method of socialization of Ukrainian citizens abroad for their subsequent decision on re-emigration. The scholars have expressed their conviction that the successful migration policy of the recipient countries can become an important obstacle to the return of Ukrainian citizens to their homeland. C. Greenaway, G. Fabreau, K. Pottie [8] studied this policy in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian war, emphasizing the importance of the Canadian government introducing a three-year visa for refugees from Ukraine in order to accelerate their socialization. The importance of state support for the socialization of Ukrainian refugees in Europe is discussed in the work of G. Bosse, and the role of foreign educational institutions in preventing re-emigration is revealed by L. Morrice [9]. In general, foreign scholars try to analyse the attractiveness of economic programs for the socialization of forced migrants, while domestic scholars try to analyse the influence of the "homeland factor". However, both of them are united in the fact that in the conditions of the war, the struggle for Ukrainian labour resources developed, which can become a significant factor influencing the development of the economy of the countries concerned.

The aim of the article is to determine the prospects for the return of Ukrainian refugees after the end of the war.

Methods. The findings of the study were obtained by using the sociological method in combination with cultural and behavioural methods. This combination allowed us to obtain verified knowledge about Ukrainian refugees' assessments of the prospects of returning to their homeland. The comparative analysis allowed us to compare the attitudes of different categories of refugees to returning to Ukraine. The use of the behavioural research method made it possible to determine the attitude of the political leadership of the EU and Ukraine to the problem of returning Ukrainian refugees, as

well as the expected steps of the governments of the EU states in assimilating them. The method of systematic analysis made it possible to form a holistic picture of the migration crisis after the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion into Ukraine.

Results. The full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, according to the conclusion of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has created the largest migration crisis since the Second World War. In the first days after Russia announced a "special military operation" against Ukraine, Russian troops advanced relatively quickly in the southern direction, capturing Kherson and approaching Kharkiv and Sumy. Such actions led to a sharp increase in the number of refugees, some of whom were moving to the western border of the state with the intention of leaving Ukraine [10]. Only as of March 3, 2022, a week after the Russian invasion, more than 1 million refugees (2.3% of Ukraine's population) were forced to move to neighbouring European countries [11]. In total, according to the UN, more than 7.9 million citizens were forced to leave the country [2]. At the same time, the Director of the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, E. Libanova, considers the figure of 7 million refugees from Ukraine, which is most often used in assessments of migration processes, to be significantly overestimated. In her opinion, about 5 million citizens left Ukraine because of the war [12].

Such scales of foreign migration pose a significant threat to the state's economy. The loss of a significant part of employees and the resulting narrowing of domestic demand will negatively affect the stability of the development of certain sectors of the economy and the service sector [13]. With large-scale external migration at the end of February – beginning of March 2022, the aggregate domestic demand decreased by almost 25% [14]. The total number of jobs lost during the war is estimated at 4.8 million [15]. In addition, the departure of the able-bodied population abroad will certainly complicate the implementation of innovative projects, the reconstruction of production facilities destroyed during the hostilities, and may become a strong argument against the restoration of some of the destroyed mono-functional settlements in the East and South of Ukraine. Ukraine is already experiencing a shortage of medical workers, educators, and service sector employees. The departure of a significant number of children abroad will be increasingly noticeable in the future. It is possible that some of them will refuse to return due to security or other reasons. This can cause uneven filling of schools with students and a decrease in the number of potential applicants.

The authors of the study "Ukrainian refugees 2022 in Europe – teenagers" [16] determined that the majority of children over the age of 14 left for Poland (47%) and Germany (31%). Among the respondents, 77% had no plans to migrate abroad before Russia's invasion, and 81% of respondents plan to return home, while only 12% have no such intentions. At the same time, the intentions of adults are somewhat different in the direction of an increase in the number of those who want to return to Ukraine.

Thus, almost 90% of adults intend to return, while 7 % have refused to return. 21% of the surveyed adults are ready to return to Ukraine under any conditions, 15% – if they have a job, 7% – if their hometown/village is rebuilt, 2% – if they receive new housing. As a condition for returning, 56% of adults named safe living conditions, 40% – cessation of shelling, 25% – a quick end to the war. Teenagers were more categorical in this case: 59% of them named security at their place of residence as a condition for return, 58% – cessation of shelling, 39% – end of the war [17]. At the same time, according to the results of telephone surveys in 2022, adult respondents had a more pronounced "sense of home"[18; 19], and the desire to return to the usual rhythm of life and established forms of economic activity remained noticeable, even despite the threat of enemy shelling.

In favour of the decision to return to Ukraine in the summer and early autumn of 2022, there were successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which not only stopped the enemy, but also forced him to retreat in a number of important directions. The decision on re-emigration was also facilitated by the expectation of an end to active hostilities, the lack of funds for staying abroad, difficulties in social adaptation at the new place of residence, the desire to reunite with family and friends who remained in Ukraine, and the conviction that the war would not affect the central and western regions of Ukraine.

However, in the fall and winter of 2022, it became increasingly clear that the previously predicted terms for the end of the war were far from reality. It became more and more obvious that the warring parties were preparing for a protracted military campaign. Great damage was caused to Ukraine by Russian strikes on critical infrastructure facilities, which led to long-term blackouts of electricity, water and heat supply in many cities. In some cases, it was not possible to restore the full operation of utility enterprises, and disconnection of consumers from electricity supply became a common phenomenon due to the destruction of thermal power plants and equipment intended for the transmission of electricity. The need to balance the Ukraine's energy system under hostile attack led to the use of emergency and stabilization blackouts. This negatively impacted the ability of employers and employees to provide remote work, which led to certain changes in the labour market. Some employees lost the opportunity to work remotely. And this is despite the fact that on the eve of the massive rocket attacks, about 40% of migrants could not keep their previous place of work, even if they could work remotely [20].

Therefore, for some migrants, the issue of employment abroad was already on the agenda in late summer and fall of 2022. And for many, lack of knowledge of a foreign language became the main obstacle. On the other hand, 60–70% of migrants were people with higher education [21], which allowed them to adapt to new working conditions abroad if they wished. That is why appropriate language courses have been organized in the countries that received the most Ukrainian migrants (primarily Poland and Germany).

Some EU countries have shown interest in socializing Ukrainian migrants. The reason for this was the reduction in the number of the population due to the decrease in birth rates, and therefore they tried to solve this problem thanks to external migrants [22]. Germany has established the highest payments for Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war among the EU countries, and Poland has increased the number of vacancies in those industries where the employment of Ukrainian citizens was the most noticeable.

The greatest chances for legal employment in the EU countries were given to persons with the appropriate level of professional and qualification training, knowledge of modern information and communication technologies, knowledge of at least two foreign languages, who showed a high level of adaptation to the culture of the host country. Educational migrants who received their first or second education abroad with the possibility of further employment also had advantages. For other migrants, official employment usually meant a lower professional status and significant difficulties in finding a legal job. Knowledge of the features of the labour market of EU countries and the ability to adapt to the conditions of long-term residence proved to be insufficient for the majority of Ukrainian migrants.

However, in Poland, which experienced a shortage of workers in certain sectors of the economy, it was Ukrainian migrants who saved the situation on the labour market. While in 2020–2021 the main reason for Ukrainians to work in Poland was a higher level of wages, then in 2022, 45% of respondents surveyed as part of the OTTO Work Force study "How do Ukrainians evaluate work and stay in Poland in 2022?" emphasized the importance of their own security, 37% – the opportunity to earn money, and 29% – the desire to provide a better life for their families. A significant part of Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland (43%) answered that they want to wait and see how the situation in Ukraine would develop in the future. At the same time, 38% of respondents announced plans to learn the Polish language. And 21% of the surveyed Ukrainian workers in Poland said they wanted to find their own apartment. In addition, about 20% of respondents expressed their intention to bring their family to Poland, 25% stated that they do not intend to return to Ukraine from Poland after the end of the war, and almost the same number of respondents are still undecided about this. Therefore, according to the OTTO Work Force study, only about half of Ukrainian migrants retained their intention to return to Ukraine at the end of 2022 [23]. And this figure is close to the results of a study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, where it was stated that 42.9% of Ukrainians are ready to plan the future for their children and grandchildren in Ukraine [24]. But even if we take as a guide the indicator of the end of 2022 of about 50 percent of those who plan to return to Ukraine after the war, then this indicator is lower than the expected indicators that were published in the summer of 2022. Thus, at the end of August 2022, according to the results of the survey of the Razumkov Center, almost 71% of respondents planned to return to Ukraine after the war and in case of improvement of the security situation [25].

The decrease in the number of potential re-emigrants can be explained primarily by the influence of two factors: the desire to protect children from war and ensure a higher standard of living in the EU countries, which guarantee social protection, security, transparency of doing business and opportunities for social growth. This desire encourages them to learn the language of the host country, educate their children in local schools, and decide whether to purchase or rent housing for a long time.

By that time, the tools used by European countries for the socialization of migrants may become more and more effective: retraining for professions in demand on the labour market, encouraging employers to hire migrants, part-time and temporary employment programs, the practice of creating programs for the development of self-employment among immigrants, providing legal and information support for their business [26, p. 28].

On the other hand, for some refugees, the difficulty of adapting to living conditions in the EU countries can be a determining factor for making a decision to return to Ukraine. Despite a relatively long stay outside Ukraine, not all migrants (even children) have been able to get used to new living conditions. Some Ukrainians are not satisfied with the working conditions in the service sector, healthcare, and purchase of housing. Those who planned to leave Ukraine even before the war are more adapted to such conditions. Their total number can be about 10 % of migrants [27].

The massive shelling of Ukraine's critical infrastructure in the fall and winter of 2022 did not cause a new wave of migration from Ukraine. Most respondents did not want to leave the territory of Ukraine in winter.

However, the duration of hostilities and the extent of settlement destruction are most likely to be among the most determining factors for external Ukrainian migrants. The optimistic forecast about the end of the war in 2023 is most likely to come true no earlier than the fall.

Ukrainian legislation does not provide a solution to the entire complex of problems that may arise in conditions of large-scale re-emigration. This primarily concerns determining the conditions for rebuilding destroyed housing and providing temporary housing to those who have returned to Ukraine. The terms of restoration of destroyed commercial premises, including the procedure for compensating entrepreneurs for losses, also require settlement. Assignment of responsibility on the aggressor country cannot ensure expedited refunds and compensation for losses. Therefore, it is important that returnees receive the right to participate in the local distribution of funds allocated by foreign partners for the reconstruction of Ukraine. This is also important taking into consideration that a significant number of those who return may prefer to live in regions that have been less affected by hostilities. This is likely to lead to significant changes in the settlement structure of the population, and therefore it is important to take this fact into account when providing assistance and compensation payments to re-emigrants.

Conclusions. At the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, mainly representatives of small and medium-sized businesses and/or their relatives and friends left Ukraine. A significant number of migrants had enough money

to ensure their own residence abroad for a certain period of time. At the same time, there were many enterprising citizens among the migrants who were able to adapt to different business conditions, and the general level of education of the migrants turned out to be quite high, which made it easier for them to find employment if they were ready to master the language of the recipient country.

In most cases, migrants live abroad on their savings, and the possible threat to their lives and health in the hostilities keeps them from returning. The availability of housing is a determining factor for returning for a relatively small number of respondents. The possibility of free economic activity after the end of hostilities is much more important. The opportunity to work in business structures or to manage them acts as the biggest motivating factor for the return to Ukraine of the interviewed citizens of Ukraine who became forced migrants.

At the same time, slightly better business conditions, particularly in Poland, attract those who refuse to return to Ukraine. Thus, in order to encourage the return of business representatives, Ukraine needs to ensure an attractive investment climate and the possibility of stable economic development. The fulfilment of these conditions can be a significant incentive for those who plan to return in the future but have not yet decided on a possible time of return.

Ukrainian scholars somewhat exaggerate the influence of the "sense of home" as a decisive factor in re-emigration. And foreign scientists tend to exaggerate the possibility of earning more on the territory of the EU compared to Ukraine as a decisive factor in the decision not to return to Ukraine.

The end of hostilities will become a decisive factor in determining the pace of re-emigration. If in the spring of 2022, the absolute majority of respondents, expressing hope for a quick end to hostilities (perhaps by May 9), hoped to quickly return to Ukraine, then over time a growing number of respondents expressed the opinion about the forced necessity to stay abroad for permanent residence. The change in the respective moods was already noticeable in the summer of 2022 and became dominant in the autumn. At this time, a significant number of Ukrainian migrants who planned to return to Ukraine have already done so, and mostly women with children remained abroad, for whom security issues as a condition for returning became dominant. Realizing that they would have to stay outside Ukraine for an indefinite period of time, Ukrainian migrants began to think more and more about the prospects of economic activity outside their home country. The duration of the hostilities and the nature of the war with rocket attacks on the civilian population led to the migrants' awareness of the difficulties of resuming economic activity in the field of private entrepreneurship in Ukraine.

Enterprising citizens among the re-emigrants will become the object of confrontation between Ukrainian local officials who will want to concentrate such citizens as much as possible on the territory under their control. The presence of enterprising businessmen can contribute to the revival of production, intensify entrepreneurial activity, and create new jobs in the regions. And this, in turn, can stimulate demand, which will then become a driving

factor in the development of production. Therefore, the creation and implementation of regional programs to support entrepreneurial activity can become a significant factor in ensuring re-emigration.

Such programs may include quantitative and qualitative components. The quantitative component may involve an increase in the number of benefits for running a private business, and the qualitative component may include the deferral of tax payments and payments determined by local authorities for certain types of business activity. The problem of allocating land plots for the development of business projects will also become quite acute. The impossibility to resume business activities in the de-occupied territories and in the combat zone in the near future (including due to the need to demine these territories) will contribute to the growth of demand for land plots in regions where there have been no direct hostilities, where the energy infrastructure has been preserved after enemy shelling, and where there are intact transportation routes. Therefore, it will be important for the local authorities to restore the road connections as soon as possible, which can be a significant factor in business development in the region and, at the same time, a motivator for re-emigration, as the restoration of logistics will provide an opportunity to quickly restore the business environment.

After the end of hostilities, it is possible to recommend to local authorities in Ukraine to offer migrants to decide on their place of residence due to restrictions on remote work for public sector employees. At the same time, such a decision should not be made in the conditions of war, as it could harm re-emigration in the future. It is also worth preserving the possibility of distance learning in Ukrainian higher education institutions, as in the future the desire to obtain a relevant diploma may become decisive in choosing a permanent place of residence.

The vast majority of Ukrainian migrants in the EU countries do not call the de-occupation of their native settlement a condition for returning to Ukraine, as for many of them, the cessation of hostilities is enough for return. For a large part of forced migrants, their possible participation in the post-war reconstruction and ensuring Ukraine's economic leap is important. Awareness of the need to provide foreign assistance to rebuild the destroyed cities and villages of Ukraine may also be important for returnees in terms of their own participation in the distribution of funds allocated for local reconstruction. In this case, their business experience can serve to increase the efficiency of the using local resources.

Conflict of interest. The authors declare that they have no financial or non-financial conflicts of interest concerning this publication; have no relationship with any government agency or commercial or non-commercial organization that might have an interest in presenting this point of view. Given that the authors are employed by an institution that is the publisher of the journal, which may lead to a potential conflict or suspicion of bias, the final decision to publish this article (including the selection of reviewers and editors) was made by those members of the editorial board who are not affiliated with this institution.

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